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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to examine whether shareholders consider the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) as value-relevant for the participating firms. An analysis is conducted of 
the share prices changes as caused by the first publication of compliance data in April, 2006, 
which disclosed an over-allocation of emission allowances. Through an event study, it is 
shown that share prices actually increased as a result of the allowance price drop when firms 
have a lower carbon-intensity of production and larger allowance holdings. There was no 
significant value impact from firms’ allowance trade activity or from the pass-through of 
carbon-related production costs (carbon leakage). The conclusion is that the EU ETS does 
‘bite’. The main impact on the share prices of firms arises from their carbon-intensity of 
production. The EU ETS is thus valued as a restriction on pollution. 




To meet its greenhouse gas emission targets, the European Union (EU) has introduced in 
2005 the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).2 This scheme is based on “cap-and-
trade” regulation. The total amount of emissions is ‘capped’ and the EU emission allowances, 
which make up the subsets of that total amount, are tradable. In Phase I (2005-2007) and 
Phase II (2008-2012) of the EU ETS, the total domestic supply of allowances was determined 
through National Allocation Plans (NAP). However, at the end of April, 2006, the first EU 
Member State annual reports were published. These reports showed that national demand for 
allowances in 2005 was much less than supply. The resulting carbon price drop was the main 
signal that market participants revised their expectations on the shortage of allowances.  
 But while supply was larger than demand, the carbon price did not immediately fall to 
zero. And while one can expect investors to put a lower valuation on cleaner rather than 
dirtier firms, the statistics (to be shown later) suggest that dirtier firms instead received a 
lower valuation. Yet, if the carbon price drop lowers firms’ valuations, it does not suggest 
that the EU ETS is costly. Since share prices reflect the firms' future profitability, the EU 
ETS ‘bite’ is in the market’s expectation of its future related costs. The aim of this paper is to 
find out whether investors consider the EU ETS as relevant for polluting firms, and how this 
is related to the firms’ allowance allocations and transactions.  
The central question of this paper is therefore: Did EU ETS firms’ shareholders 
interpret the April 2006 carbon price drop as significant and, if so, how did the event’s impact 
differ among firms’ allocations and transactions? 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the literature will be reviewed on the 
EU ETS how the impact of the EU ETS differs through the related allocations and 
transactions. In Section 3, hypotheses are formulated on the share price responsiveness 
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through which the carbon price drop impacted the EU ETS firms. The methodology will be 
discussed in Section 4. The empirical results and a discussion thereof will be presented in 
Sections 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review 
With an abundant supply of allowances one may expect the regulation did not affect the 
firms’ management or share prices. For example, Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) showed for 
a sample of German firms that allocations did not impact revenues and employment. Kettner 
et al. (2008) concluded it was unlikely that abatement had taken place. 
However, ex-post research shows the EU ETS did have an impact on firms. Anderson 
and Di Maria (2011) showed there were both ‘under-allocations’ as well as ‘over-allocations’ 
and that some firms did reduce emissions. Abrell et al. (2011) found that the profit margins of 
over-allocated firms were positively affected, et vice versa. Furthermore, the market 
valuations of firms were responsive to the carbon price. For example, Oestreich and Tsiakas 
(2012) analyse the “carbon premium”, defined as the share price return difference of dirty 
versus clean firms. They find that this premium is higher for dirtier firms. However, when 
focusing on energy companies in the EU, Koch and Bassen (2013) find the opposite, namely 
that dirtier firms have higher costs of capital due to carbon related risks and thus a lower 
equity value. Moreover, through an event study on the April 2006 carbon price drop, 
Bushnell et al. (2013) shows that the market values of dirtier non-energy industries declined 
more, i.e. dirtier firms were more heavily penalized, as was found for the energy industry in 
Koch and Bassen (2013).3 Among energy firms, however, the impact was the opposite, i.e. 
being cleaner will be penalized, as with Oestreich and Tsiakas (2012).  
This study contributes to the literature through the inclusion of the firms’ allowance 
purchases and sales from the EU ETS database: the European Union Transaction Log 
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(EUTL). Only three studies have analysed these EU ETS transactions. Both Jaraitė and 
Kažukauskas (2012) and Zaklan (2013) examine determinants in purchasing and selling 
allowances. Yet, to our knowledge the impact of these transactions on share prices has not 
been analysed yet. 
Bushnell et al. (2013) also conduct an event study on the same allowance price fall in 
the EU ETS. However, our paper is different from theirs. First, where Bushnell et al. (2013) 
make an industry comparison by focusing on power versus non-power industries, we use a 
more specific categorization of industries to test the effect of the allowance price fall on share 
prices. Second, contrary to Bushnell et al. (2013) we bring the buying and selling of 
allowances, which is the very essence of emissions trading, into the analysis, by incorporating 
such purchases and sales into a number of hypotheses. Third, as a result our conclusions 
partly reproduce but also partly differ from theirs, which enhances the validity of both studies 
and adds new insights to this carbon market event. 
The literature thus shows that the ex-post results are mixed on the impacts of over-
allocation and of carbon-intensive production, and that there is a literature gap regarding the 
effects of allowance trade on share prices. This paper fills these gaps by incorporating 
allowance trade with the allocation and the product market in determining the EU ETS 
impact on share prices. In the next section hypotheses are formulated on the interplay of these 
three factors. 
3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Several related effects on firms’ market values occur simultaneously with a change in the 
carbon price. The three main effects, discussed below, are: (1) carbon leakage and carbon-
intensity effects, (2) exposure and borrowing effects, and (3) trade effects. 
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3.1 Carbon leakage and carbon-intensity effects 
Carbon-intensive production becomes less attractive in an emissions trading scheme.  
‘Carbon leakage’ refers to the consequential relocation of companies, and thus emissions, to 
countries where restrictions on carbon emissions are weaker. Firms competing with firms 
from outside the system cannot or can partly pass on carbon-related costs in their product 
prices. This decreases their profit margins. Once the carbon price drops, the profit margins 
and thus share prices should increase of firms within the EU ETS. The first hypothesis H.1 is 
therefore: 
Market values of firms with carbon leakage increase. Increases are larger for dirtier 
firms, i.e. with a higher carbon-intensity of production, than for cleaner firms.    (H.1)  
Hence, if firms can pass-through less than 100% of their carbon-related costs, a drop in the 
carbon price increases the market value of such firms. 
However, if firms can pass on at least 100%, i.e. they do not suffer from carbon 
leakage, the carbon price drop decreases product revenues, profits and thus their market 
values.4 Indeed, Oberndorfer (2009) finds a positive share-price-to-carbon-price relationship 
for European power firms. The carbon cost margin, i.e. the carbon price times the emissions 
per unit of production, is higher for firms with a dirtier production. Product prices of dirtier 
firms will thus decrease more when the carbon price drops, lowering their profits and thus 
their share prices. Contrary to H.1, the impact for dirty versus clean firms is thus the opposite. 
As a result, the second hypothesis H.2 is that:  
Market values of firms without carbon leakage decrease.  
Decreases are larger for dirtier firms than for cleaner firms.           (H.2) 
6 
 
3.2 Exposure and borrowing effects 
Polluting firms in the EU ETS either receive their allowances for free or they have to buy 
them at auction. Auctioning or free allocation have similar economic costs (costs of buying 
allowances or the opportunity costs of using free allowances) but do effect accounting profits 
and the market values of firms differently. Firms receiving free allowances should thus have 
higher market values than comparable firms having to buy them at auction. Typically, the 
former is long on allowances, while the latter is short. The carbon price drop should thus have 
lowered the cost burden for firms that were short on allowances on an annual basis. The 
hypothesis is that investors see the accumulation of these lowered cost burdens into increases 
in market values. The third hypothesis is thus as follows: 
Market values increase the more firms are short on allowances.     
Market values decrease the more firms are long on allowances.           (H.3) 
However, in the short-term the price drop decreases the value of allowances held in stock. 
This negatively affects the market values of firms. One of the features of the EU ETS 
Directives (2003/87/EC and 2009/29/EC) allowing firms to manage short-term impacts is 
called ‘borrowing’. In the EU ETS, firms receive their next year’s allocation of allowances 
prior to the compliance date for their current year’s emissions. Firms can thus ‘borrow’ these 
allowances to cover for their current year’s emissions. But in case firms foresaw the carbon 
price drop they should also have sold any of their remaining allocation holdings. As such a 
strategy is a signal of market insight, firms with lower net stock positions should have higher 
market values. The fourth hypothesis is then as follows: 
Market values increase the more firms decreased their net stock holdings by 
borrowing and selling allowances.               (H.4) 
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3.3 Trade effects 
If rational expectations are assumed, firms should trade for any discrepancies between 
allocations and emissions. However, firms do not only trade to eliminate these mismatches, 
they may also actively bet on carbon market developments. Active traders might know more 
about the workings of the market and thus have an information advantage. Investors might 
therefore positively value firms active at trading allowances, irrespective of whether they are 
buying or selling. The last hypothesis is thus as follows: 
Market values increase the larger the firms’ shares in the allowance trade.         (H.5) 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Abnormal share returns 
In order to estimate the market valuation effects around the carbon price shock, we use an 
event study. This approach was introduced by Fama et al. (1969) initially for corporate 
finance purposes, but has also been applied within the field of regulatory economics. 
The event study methodology implicitly assumes the market is efficient: all available 
information impacting future profits of firms is discounted into the share prices. If an event is 
significant for a firm it should thus be possible to extract from its share price the firm-specific 
returns associated with the event.5 Subsequently, these “abnormal returns” can be analysed by 
relating them to these firm’s characteristics. Here the firms’ industry categories, revenues, 
allocations, emissions, and allowance purchases and sales will be considered.  
For obtaining the market returns the Return Index (RI) was used from Datastream.6 
With RI the returns ri,t can be calculated by first-differencing its natural logarithm: 
ri,t ≡ log(1+RIi,t) = ln(RIi,t+1 / RIi,t) = ln(RIi,t+1) – ln(RIi,t)    (1) 
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where i stands for the company i = 1,…, N and i = m denotes the market index. These market 
portfolio returns rm,t are proxied by the RI of the Morgan Stanley Capital International EU 
equity market index. The subscript t stands for the trading day. 
Figure 1: EU Allowance unit settlement price around the 25th of April, 2006 (in €)
 
As Figure 1 shows, the start of the event window is to be pinpointed at the 24th as it is the last 
day the price moved upwards. And since the price fall took off from the 25th we consider it 
the day of the event, i.e. for which t = 0.7 The inclusion of the 24th, i.e. for which t = -1, 
allows for the effects of prior information on the share prices. The event window should not 
encompass too many days as that may affect the degree of bias of the statistical analysis, but 
with too few days the impact of the event may not be captured (e.g. Campbell et al., 1997). 
We therefore devise three event windows: one with the 26th of April (t1 = {-1,1}), one with 
the 27th (t2 = {-1,2}), and one with the 28th (t3 = {-1,3}).8  
In order to estimate the “abnormal” returns caused by the event a business-as-usual 
estimate is needed. This estimate was determined by running, for each firm, an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression: 




These OLS regressions are run in a sufficiently large time period of 60 days before the event, 
the estimation window.9 The next step is to plug the estimation window intercepts ( iαˆ ) and 
beta’s ( iβˆ ), and the event window’s realized firm (ri,t) and market returns (rm,t) into equation 
(3):  
 ri,t = iαˆ  + iβˆ rm,t + εi,t         (3) 
The error term εi,t represents the abnormal returns (ARi,t). It is standard to aggregate these 
returns over the event window. Since if these returns are significantly affected during the 
event window, they will not revolve around zero but maintain a new level. For t1, for 
example, these cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) can be calculated by summing ARi,t from t 
= -1 to t = 1. 
4.2 Carbon leakage and carbon-intensity effects 
For the carbon leakage estimate we draw on three Commission decisions (European 
Commission, 2010; 2011; 2012). These include lists of product categories deemed exposed to 
‘carbon leakage’. As these product categories are provided in NACE codes, a dummy 
variable carbleaki is defined equaling 1 if a firm’s NACE code appears in the three 
Commission Decisions’ lists.  
The carbon-intensity of production (called: carbintensi) is estimated as follows10,11: 
carbintensi,2005 = emissionsi,2005 / revenuesi,2005 * 100%    (4) 
The effect of carbon-intensity on share prices depends whether a firm suffers from carbon 
leakage. We take care of this interaction via a variable carbileaki, the product of carbintensi 
and carbleaki.  
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Hypothesis H.1 suggests that with carbon leakage, share prices of dirtier firms 
increase more than those of cleaner firms. H.1 will then be accepted if carbleaki and 
carbileaki are positively related to CARi. To accept H.2, the opposite should hold. 
4.3 Exposure and borrowing effects 
Regarding the value effects associated with allocations and emissions two effects are 
important: 1) an exposure valuation: the allocations minus emissions amounts to come, and 2) 
a stock valuation: the value of allowances firms currently have in stock. As to the exposure 
valuation, it is expected that investors see annual shortfalls or surpluses in relative terms. One 
thus only needs to take the difference between allocations and verified emissions and divide it 
by either of the two. But for a part of the allowance transactions, it could not be discerned 
whether allocations belonged to the 2005 or 2006 tranches. The sum of the two allocations 












   (5) 
where emissionsi,2005 are multiplied by two given the two allocation tranches.12 Hypothesis 
H.3 suggests market values increase (decrease) the more firms are short (long) on allowances. 
H.3 will then be accepted if expi is negatively related to CARi. 
For the stock valuation effect, we devised a net holding estimate which takes into 
account 1) the possibility for firms to borrow, and 2) the net allowances sales – since, at 
higher pre-event carbon prices, it would have been profitable if firms had also sold their 2006 
allocations. The reference date for the net holdings is set at the 30th of April, 2006, when 

















borrow ∑∑   (6) 
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Hypothesis H.4 suggests market values increase the more firms decreased their stock 
holdings. For H.4 to be accepted borrowi needs to be positively related to CARi. 
4.4 Trade effects 
Investors may value firms that are active at trading allowances, irrespective of whether they 


























enstrade   (7) 
In addition, a dummy variable notradei is defined equaling 1 for firms which had nor 
purchases nor sales, and zero otherwise. 
Hypothesis H.5 suggests market values increase the larger the firms’ shares in the 
allowance trade. For H.5 to be accepted tradeintensi needs to be positively related to CARi.  
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Firm and industry selection criteria 
By labeling with the Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) Orbis database codes, we identified 10,419 of 
10,650 installations operators from the National Allocation Plans (NAP), and 5,737 of the 
5,957 European Transaction Log (EUTL) accountholders which appeared in the 2005-2006 
transactions. The majority of the installations’ operator names were provided through 
overviews on the EU ETS website. The BvD-labelling of the remaining installations or EUTL 
transaction accounts was possible with other provided details, such as the names of the 
installations or accountholders themselves. Moreover, there are 25,020 transactions between 
the first transaction and the last one on the 30th of April, 2006. 898 of them are conducted 
among the same accountholders, e.g. for moving allowances from one national registry to 
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another, 9,664 are allocations and 4,743 are surrendered allowances. The inter-account trade 
data is thus based on the remaining 9,715 transactions. 
The only common identifier in the NAPs and the EUTL transactions were the 
accountholder names. For most accountholder names in the NAPs, the received and 
surrendered allowances could be traced in the transactions. NAP accountholders that did not 
appear in the transactions before end December, 2006, were not included in the analysis (776 
accountholders controlling 1,073 installations). By not appearing in allowance transactions, 
we considered these accounts must have opted out from the EU ETS. The main allocations 
and emissions source we opted for were the NAPs; unlike the EUTL transactions it provides 
the verified emissions.14 We complemented it with accounts which did not appear in the 
NAPs but according to the transactions received or surrendered allowances up until the 30th 
of April, 2006. We further included EUTL transaction accounts that were used for trading 
purposes only (and not for allowance allocations or surrenders). 
The next step was to obtain the firms’ International Security Identification Numbers 
(ISINs) or exchange-listing codes from Orbis. On the basis of the accountholder names and 
these listing codes, we merged the 2005-2006 allocations, emissions, and the cumulative 
purchases and sales until the 30th of April, 2006. Furthermore, firms were only selected if 
they took part in the EU ETS by having allocations and/or emissions, by having traded 
allowances, or both. For several firms data was unavailable in Datastream or Orbis on the 
share prices, revenues or total assets, decreasing the number of firms from 506 to 393. Table I 






Table I: Sample of EU ETS accountholders  
Number  of accountholders NAP-related 




EU ETS total 6132 208 435 6775 
01-01-2005 to 31-12-2006 (10,650 installations)       
Identified, in transactions, and 
firm-specific data is available: 2,167 99 191 2,457 
01-01-2005 to 30-04-2006 (4,121 installations)     
- of which: listed firms 1,128 25 139 1,292 
  (2424 installations)   
- of which: non-listed firms 1,039 74 52 1,165 
(1,697 installations)   
 
From the 2,167 identified accountholders, 1,128 (53%) and 1,039 (48%) are assigned to the 
listed and non-listed firms, respectively. From Orbis we obtained the firms’ NACE Rev. 2 
core codes. Based on the contents of the NACE code text descriptions, the NACE industries 
were checked whether they were among the European Commission’s lists of carbon leakage 
industries, and they were categorized into the following ETS sectors: 1) Power & Heat, 2) 
Iron, Steel & Coke, 3) Cement & Lime, 4) Refineries, 5) Pulp & Paper, 6) Glass, 7) 
Ceramics, Bricks & Tiles, 8) Unidentified / Others.15,16,17 
5.2 Cumulative abnormal returns 
The share prices, which determined the abnormal returns, are themselves established at the 
end of each trading day. These prices should thus reflect the carbon price changes on t = 0 for 







Figure 2: Full sample average abnormal returns within event window t = {-2,3} 
Figure 2 shows the path of the full sample average abnormal returns (ARs, not CARs) over an 
event window of t = {-2,3}. This event window illustrates that before and until t = 0, the 
abnormal returns gravitated to the negative. The initial and positive response to the news 
came at t = 1, suggesting investors belatedly realized the information had an impact on the 
firms’ valuations. The market re-evaluated this shock (downwards) at t = 2. And it took 
another day for the ARs to tend back to zero, indicating the impact was not substantial 
overall. We thus expect event window t1 = {-1,1} to be informative as it includes the initial 
response to the news. Other event windows we consider are t2 = {-1,2} and t3 = {-1,3} which 
provide insights into the share price corrections the days after.  
Table II shows the descriptive statistics for the CARs for the three event windows t1, 
t2, and t3.18 From t1 to t2 the average firm saw a decline in the mean of its CAR, but there was 






Table II: Descriptive statistics on the CARs and on their significance 
Full sample Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6 Sector 7 Sector 8 
CAR(-1,1) N = 393 N = 25 N = 34 N = 13 N = 67 N = 34 N = 5 N = 4 N = 211 
Mean -0,25% -0,90% -0,31% 1,09% -0,47% -0,62% -0,28% 1,88% -0,16% 
Std. dev. 2,91% 2,58% 3,99% 3,07% 2,98% 2,58% 2,03% 2,45% 2,78% 
Median -0,25% -0,58% -0,05% 0,62% -0,45% -0,30% -0,72% 1,94% -0,17% 
Minimum -13,07% -6,99% -13,07% -2,14% -8,42% -6,98% -2,31% -1,14% -11,55% 
Maximum 11,91% 4,84% 8,20% 8,99% 9,92% 6,35% 2,96% 4,78% 11,91% 
T-test -1,71* -1,74* -0,45 1,28 -1,3 -1,41 -0,31 1,54 -0,82 
SCAR test -1,68* -2,61*** -0,61 2,58*** -2,61*** -2,34** 0,43 2,88*** 0,16 
CAR(-1,2) 
Mean -0,75% -1,96% -2,34% 0,39% -1,16% -1,22% 0,49% 1,60% -0,29% 
Std. dev. 4,11% 2,77% 4,30% 3,03% 3,72% 2,92% 3,28% 3,58% 4,48% 
Median -0,69% -1,27% -1,89% -0,05% -0,72% -1,40% -0,97% 2,00% -0,34% 
Minimum -21,02% -8,62% -10,96% -2,96% -11,13% -7,21% -2,84% -3,14% -21,02% 
Maximum 36,40% 2,36% 10,23% 8,71% 9,55% 7,04% 5,51% 5,54% 36,40% 
T-test -3,63*** -3,54*** -3,17*** 0,46 -2,55** -2,44** 0,33 0,9 -0,95 
SCAR test -6,97*** -6,07*** -6,04*** 0,88 -5,2*** -4,37*** 1,01 2,56** -1,04 
CAR(-1,3) 
Mean -0,83% -1,73% -1,74% 0,32% -1,51% -1,10% -0,29% 1,64% -0,44% 
Std. dev. 4,97% 3,37% 5,69% 3,53% 4,30% 4,43% 4,86% 2,76% 5,36% 
Median -0,86% -1,18% -2,03% 0,51% -1,23% -1,34% -2,73% 1,62% -0,47% 
Minimum -25,15% -10,20% -11,31% -3,42% -12,40% -8,98% -5,13% -1,72% -25,15% 
Maximum 43,86% 3,04% 13,11% 8,84% 9,87% 12,31% 5,18% 5,05% 43,86% 
T-test -3,3*** -2,56** -1,78* 0,32 -2,87*** -1,44 -0,13 1,19 -1,2 
SCAR test -7,85*** -5,21*** -5,07*** 0,55 -7,05*** -3,89*** 0,96 2,58*** -2** 
 
 
For the significance of the CARs two types of test statistics are provided: the t-test and the 
standardized CAR (or: SCAR) test (cf. Campbell et al., 1997: section 4.4). The SCAR test 
weighs the CARs with the standard error of the estimation regression (cf. Section 4.1, 
equation 2). The corresponding p-values in Table II show that the (S)CARs are significantly 
different from zero.  
If we consider t1, the SCAR test statistics point to significance of returns for five 
sectors. However, the mean CAR from the full sample is only significant at the 90% 
confidence level. As they are more significant for t2 and t3, this lends support to include these 
days in the analysis. In t2 and t3, four sectors had significant negative returns (sectors 1, 2, 4, 
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and 5), and one had small negative returns (sector 8).19 Hence, also from a sector perspective 
it is clear that the returns were negative in general. 
Although the CARs seem small, the total value effect is substantial. Multiplying all 
firms’ CARs with their average equity market values in April, 2006, yields a net value effect 
of € -54 billion for t2.20 To put this figure into perspective, we can estimate the change in the 
opportunity costs of holding allowances by taking the carbon price drop over t2 (€ 13,14) and 
multiplying it by the sum of the firms’ two remaining allocations for Phase I.21 We find that 
these opportunity costs account for 1,22% of the firms’ total April 2006 average equity 
market values, and 55,5% of the change in the April 2006 average equity market value as 
caused by the carbon price drop. 
5.3 Carbon leakage and carbon-intensity effects 
The first section of Table III shows the full sample statistics on carbon leakage and the 
carbon-intensity of production.22 The variable carbintens, or the amount of emissions per unit 
of revenues, has an average of 0,04%. This implies that, on average, there is one tonne of 
CO2 emissions for every 25 Euro in revenues. The associated positive skewness of 6,55 
indicates that there are few firms emitting many emissions per unit of revenues and that there 
are many firms with few emissions per unit of revenues. The mean of carbleak (55%) shows 
that the majority of firms is prone to carbon leakage. 
Table III: Full sample descriptive statistics on the product market, exposure, borrowing, 
and allowance trading 
Full sample Mean Std. dev. Median Min. Max. Skew. N 
carbintens 0,04% 0, 12% 0,003% 0% 1,23% 6,55 366 
carbleak 55,22% 49,79% 100% 0% 100% -0,21 393 
carbileak  0,02% 0,06% 0% 0% 0,68% 6,65 366 
exp 10,9% 54,86% 12,52% -928% 100% -13,44 377 
borrow -78,11% 2.285% 47,48% -44.237% 232% -19,3 377 
tradeintens 0,25% 1,03% 0% 0% 9,53% 5,58 393 




Table IV: Sector level descriptive statistics on the product market, exposure, borrowing, 
and allowance trading 
 Listed firms 
  
Full 
sample Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5 Sector 6 Sector 7 Sector 8 
  
N = 393 N = 25 N = 34 N = 13 N = 67 N = 34 N = 5 N = 4 N = 211 
N   157 22 1 3 11 3 0 0 117 
carbintens, where      
carbleak = 0 A 0,05% 0,28% 0,13% 0,03% 0,01% 0,003% n.a. n.a. 0,01% 
N 217 1 33 10 56 31 5 4 77 
carbintens, where    
carbleak = 1 A 0,03% 0,0001% 0,04% 0,19% 0,02% 0,04% 0,05% 0,05% 0,01% 
N 366 23 33 12 67 32 5 4 190 
carbintens A 0,04% 0,26% 0,05% 0,15% 0,02% 0,04% 0,05% 0,05% 0,01% 
B 0,02% 0,16% 0,03% 0,09% 0,004% 0,01% 0,02% 0,004% 0,003% 
carbileak A 0,02% 5E-06% 0,04% 0,14% 0,02% 0,04% 0,05% 0,05% 0,002% 
N 
 
377 23 33 13 67 33 5 4 199 
exp A 10,90% -1% 10,08% 15,22% 14,51% 24% 11,71% 13,70% 8,68% 
  B -0,99% -13,92% 22% 9,16% 13,31% 24% 10,53% 21,61% 9,53% 
borrow A -78,11% 65,40% 48,74% 45,54% 49,18% 51,24% 29,65% 50,05% -193,40% 
  B 48,37% 48,74% 54,91% 46,13% 49,68% 50,35% -2,53% 49,59% 45,04% 
N 
 
393 25 34 13 67 34 5 4 211 
tradeintens A 0,25% 1,64% 0,19% 0,26% 0,07% 0,02% 0,58% 0,00% 0,19% 
  B 100% 41,08% 6,59% 3,34% 4,36% 0,80% 2,89% 0,01% 40,93% 
notrade A 54,71% 20% 55,88% 38,46% 53,73% 47,06% 20% 50% 62,09% 
 
Table IV provides for the variables a full sample average, sector averages (A) and a ‘sector 
ratio’ (B). The latter is calculated by considering each sector as being one ’firm’. The 
allocations, surrenders, allowance purchases and sales are summed up per sector.  
Both the sector average (A) and sector ratio (B) indicate that especially sector 1 
(Power & Heat) but also sector 3 (Cement & Lime) emit most CO2 per unit of revenue. 
Compared to the other sectors, their production is three to twenty-six times more carbon-
intensive. However, sector 1 and sector 3 differ with respect to carbon leakage. In accordance 
with Hypothesis H.1, sector 3 with its high carbon leakage has positive CARs due to the 
carbon price drop. And sector 1 with no carbon leakage has negative CARs, which is in 
accordance with H.2. The outcomes of sectors 4, 5, and 8 are not in line with H.1 or H.2 since 
positive CARs were to be expected, given their carbon leakage. 
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 Furthermore, Table IV shows that the average carbon-intensity is larger for firms 
without carbon leakage (0,05%) than for those with carbon leakage (0,03%). This is mainly 
due to the relatively high carbon-intensity of Sector 1 (0,28%). Without sector 1 the statistics 
point out that, when subject to carbon leakage, firms produce with a relatively higher carbon-
intensity. 
5.4 Exposure and borrowing effects 
Table III further reports the descriptive statistics for the variables exp and borrow. It shows 
most firms were long on allowances; see the positive average and median values of exp.  
The variable borrow is the ratio of the stock of allowances on the 30th of April, 2006, 
divided by the allocations of 2005 and 2006. The mean of -78% shows that the average firm 
expended and sold less allowances than it purchased. However, with 47,5% the median firm 
expended 95% of its 2005 allocation and banked the remainder plus the 2006 allocation. This 
implies a few firms skew the borrow variable towards a large negative mean, i.e. most firms 
were long in allowances. 
That these surpluses were not subsequently sold off is an indication that many did not 
foresee the carbon price drop. On the other hand, the picture from borrow may be distorted. 
Our data only contains transactions from the spot market but not the derivatives market. 
Firms which purchased allowances on the spot market and sold them (at higher prices) 
through forwards and futures thus appear as not having foreseen the carbon price drop, while 
they actually may have profited from it via the derivatives market. This may be the case for 
three firms (Barclays PLC, AB Electrolux, and Severn Trent PLC) which had highly negative 
borrow values.23 
The sector perspective on exp and borrow is provided in the second section of Table 
IV. For most sectors the averages differ from their sector ratios, but the signs do not. The 
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result remains that all except sector 1 (Power & Heat) are long on allowances. Interestingly, 
the full sample average of 11% differs from the full sample sector ratio for the EU ETS of      
-1%. It implies that, on average, firms are long but on the whole the EU ETS is short. This 
number is close to the range of the EU ETS allocation estimations from Ellerman and 
Buchner (2008) and Anderson and Di Maria (2011). These were in the order of +0,6% and     
-0,5%, respectively. Hence, although the number is small, in aggregate the listed firms faced 
pressure to reduce their pollution.  
The sector values for borrow are in accordance with those of Table III as values were 
in the 45-50% range. Only sectors 1, 5, and 7 borrowed from their 2006 allocations as their 
borrow rates were in the 50-100% range. For sector 1 it is to be expected to borrow given its 
shortfall in allowances. Sector 5 (Pulp & Paper), however, is long in allowances but the data 
show that pulp and paper firms used 51% of their two allocation tranches, either via covering 
their emissions or via net sales. 
5.5 Trade effects 
The last statistics in Table III are on the allowance trade. As the zero median of tradeintens 
indicates, most firms did not trade in allowances. The mean of notrade indicates this was the 
case for 55% of firms. Furthermore, the average firm’s share of total EU ETS purchases and 
sales was 0,25%. The skewness of 5,58 indicates that a few firms conducted most of the trade 
in allowances.  
The trade differences among industry sectors are provided in the last section of Table 
IV. The sector ratios of tradeintens show that most trade originates from sector 1 (Power & 
Heat) and 8 (Unidentified / Others) with, respectively, 41,1% and 40,9% of total allowance 
trade. The sector averages, though, indicate that the average firm in sectors 2, 3, and 6 traded 
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about as much or even more than the average firm within sector 8. Sectors 4, 5, and 7 were 
the least active. 
5.6 Cross-sectional regression 
In the OLS regressions the statistics point to a non-normal distribution of the residuals.24 
Normality of residuals, though, is not a sufficient condition for obtaining consistent 
estimates. In order to test whether the assumptions of the regression models are correct, Long 
and Trivedi (1992) suggests applying two types of specification tests: the robust LM 
Ramsey’s RESET test and the Information Matrix (IM) test. If these tests are passed, the 
“interpretation of OLS estimates and application of standard statistical tests are justified” 
(Long and Trivedi, 1992).  
There are five hypotheses to test over three event windows.25 We group the variables 
in four blocks related to these hypotheses. Then we take up all significant variables in a 
subsequent regression. In Table V the OLS results with robust clustered standard errors are 
provided for the three windows.26 The two specification tests do not point towards a 
misspecification of the estimated model.  
A first inference one can make is that the fit of the model is weak, given the low 
(adjusted) R-squared. Yet, this is to be expected since the carbon price effect only indirectly 
relates to share prices. There can always be non-EU ETS related factors playing a role in 
determining the share price movements, e.g. changes in the macro-economic environment. 
And unlike the selected EU ETS variables, it may well be that the EU ETS impact on share 
prices manifests itself through other channels. For example, a firm’s state of abatement 
technology and business strategy regarding climate change regulation, i.e. factors which are 
hardly measurable. Related to that, the carbon price shock may have changed investors’ 
expectations on the EU ETS future stringency, and that the carbon price drop induced 
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Table V: OLS regressions on the CARs from event windows t1, t2, and t3 
  Event window t1 Event window t2 Event window t3 
  H.1-H.2 H.3 H.4 H.5 H.1-H.5 H.1-H.2 H.3 H.4 H.5 H.1-H.5 H.1-H.2 H.3 H.4 H.5 H.1-H.5 
carbintens -1,649**       -1,531** -3,782***       -4,086** -1,339*       -3,107 
(0,043) (0,022) (0,0004) (0,017) (0,067) (0,251) 
carbleak -0,0003 -0,003 0,001 
(0,916) (0,187) (0,711) 
carbileak 0,005 -1,831 -7,767 
(0,997) (0,626) (0,161) 
tradeintens -0,002* -0,0005   -0,003** -0,0003   -0,003* -0,0005 
(0,08) (0,52)   (0,042) (0,682)   (0,082) (0,761) 
notrade -0,006   -0,005   -0,008 
(0,144)   (0,377)   (0,328) 
exp 1,64E-05* 1,29E-05**   1,56E-05   1,27E-05 
(0,099) (0,036)   (0,128)   (0,348) 
borrow 5,56E-08* -2,6E-08   -1,3E-07   -4,5E-07*** -5,2E-07 
(0,066) (0,832)   (0,211)   (0,001) (0,123) 
constant -0,002 0,001 -0,002** -0,002* -0,002** -0,004 -0,004 -0,007* -0,007* -0,006* -0,007** -0,003 -0,008** -0,008** -0,007** 
  (0,421) (0,72) (0,044) (0,051) (0,049) (0,164) (0,601) (0,072) (0,073) (0,072) (0,022) (0,637) (0,032) (0,029) (0,014) 
R2 0,005 0,011 0,001 0,000 0,006 0,019 0,008 0,0005 0,0001 0,016 0,014 0,007 0,0002 0,0005 0,007 
Adjusted R2 -0,003 0,006 -0,002 -0,003 -0,005 0,011 0,003 -0,002 -0,003 0,011 0,006 0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,001 
AIC -1541,85 -1663,88 -1596,2 -1595,85 -1540,14 -1318,08 -1391,07 -1358,92 -1358,77 -1319 -1177,94 -1242,5 -1215,56 -1215,65 -1175,28 
N 366 393 377 377 366 366 393 377 377 366 366 393 377 377 366 
F-test 0,110 0,192 0,099 0,066 0,044 0,001 0,008 0,128 0,211 0,005 0,010 0,188 0,348 0,001 0,002 
RESET 0,292 0,151 0,157 0,355 0,297 0,496 0,163 0,668 0,426 0,501 0,136 0,197 0,607 0,497 0,233 
IM_total 0,071 0,144 0,109 0,102 0,781 0,806 0,430 0,714 0,720 0,955 0,803 0,610 0,693 0,717 0,998 
* / ** / ***: 90% / 95% / 99% confidence level. P-values are within brackets, R2 is the (adjusted) coefficient of determination, AIC the Akaike Information Criterion, N the number of 
observations. Null of RESET p-value: correct and robust specified conditional mean of the dependent variable. Null of IM-test p-value: joint homoscedasticity and normality of the errors (Long 




unanimity among policymakers for decreasing the EU ETS cap. Indeed, in October, 2006, the 
European Commission announced stricter NAPs for Phase II. This might explain why the 
abnormal returns were negative, even though lower carbon prices should be conceived as 
good news for cost-effectively achieving emission targets. 
Over the event windows, carbintens, tradeintens, exp, and borrow had a significant 
impact on the CARs. The variable of carbintens shows up in two full model regressions, exp 
in one, and borrow and tradeintens in none of them.  
The coefficient on carbintens is negative, indicating that the carbon price drop has a 
more negative impact on share prices of dirtier firms. For example, for event window t2, if a 
firm’s carbintens increased by one standard deviation, this would lead to an average CAR-
decrease of -0,41%. Relative to the CAR-average of -0,8% for this window, this is quite 
substantial. That investors value carbon-intensity negatively is a sign that the EU ETS is 
valued as restricting pollution. Firms are considered more profitable with lower carbon-
intensity rates as these signal towards better abatement capacities. This finding is in line with 
Koch and Bassen (2013) and runs counter to Oestreich and Tsiakas (2012) who concluded 
that investors demand a higher carbon risk premium for the (expected higher) cost of capital 
of dirtier firms. 
The insignificance of carbleak leads to a rejection of Hypotheses H.1 and H.2. The 
descriptive statistics (cf. Section 5.3) showed that only sector 1 (Power & Heat) and sector 3 
(Cement & Lime) provide support for H.1 and H.2, while the support of the six other sectors 
was the opposite. There can be several reasons for these incompatible findings. For one thing, 
the variable carbleak may not have sufficient detail. Unknown is the actual carbon pass-
through rate by firms. It is further probable that this cost pass-through threshold, for which 
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market value impacts turn positive, does not lie at/above 100% but at lower rates. Further 
research is necessary to find this out. 
The second variable, exp, is only significant in t1. The positive estimate of exp 
indicates that the carbon price drop led to larger share price increases for firms which were 
more ‘long’ or less ‘short’ on allowances. Increasing exp by 10% translates into an average 
CAR impact of 0,013%. Since the full sample average of event window t1 equals -0,3% its 
impact is small. That exp is positively related with the CARs is in contrast with Hypothesis 
H.3. This positive exp-to-CARs relationship is in line with Abrell et al. (2011) that over-
allocated firms were more profitable, the latter of which should correspond to higher share 
prices.  
 The impact on CARs from trade, or tradeintens and notrade, is absent in the full 
model regressions. It is likely that carbintens and/or exp captured the variance from the CARs 
instead. This can also explain why borrow is insignificant, since the only difference in the 
definitions of exp and borrow is the net sales in allowances. There is thus no evidence that 
investors valued the firms’ net sales of allowances, or that value is derived from the being a 
large trader, irrespective of them being buyers or sellers. Hence, both Hypothesis H.4 and H.5 
need to be rejected. 
In one respect it is surprising that the trade variables do not come up in the 
regressions. As listed firms normally manage their currency exposure, it is probable they do 
that for their carbon exposure as well. And as the carbon market was relatively new and 
carbon prices were high, market traders could have engaged in profitable trading strategies. 
Although they may have done so, it had no discernible effect on share prices. Nevertheless, it 
is also not surprising this carbon trade effect is missing. Few measures are available for 
investors to gauge a firm’s trade activity. Data on forwards and futures positions taken is not 
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publicly available. Besides, the EUTL data is published 5 years after an EU ETS calendar 
year. In some U.S. emissions trading schemes data on emissions is published daily and 
annually on the allowances transferred. While continuous monitoring of greenhouse gases 
may be expensive (at least for now), there should be no technical limits on more frequent 
publications of the transfer of allowances. Without a view on the trade in allowances, one 
cannot discern whether firms e.g. borrowed or stockpiled unused allowances. This 
information shortage constrains markets in realizing their valuable allocation properties. 
Another information constraint results from the compliance timing as laid out in the 
EU ETS Directives. While (currently) allowance auctions are spread over the calendar year 
and thus ensure a gradual feed-in of information, there is just one moment in the year that all 
firms surrender their allowances. It will be conducive to market certainty if there are more of 
such moments during the year (e.g. Holland and Moore, 2012) and that the European 
Commission subsequently reports on these compliance moments.27 This would have 
prevented or at least reduced the April 2006 shock. The more that signals on scarcity are held 
up, the more difficult it becomes for firms to forecast whether they have planned enough 
emission-reduction projects. If the release of information on the scarcity in the EU ETS is 
stepped up, situations of over-allocation such as the EU ETS faces currently are more likely 
to be averted. 
6. Conclusion 
Did EU ETS firms’ shareholders interpret the April 2006 carbon price drop as significant 
and, if so, how did the event’s impact differ among firms’ allocations and transactions? 
Through an event study the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), i.e. the event-induced share 
price returns, were derived from a sample of exchange-listed firms participating in the EU 
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ETS. The CARs statistics indicate that shareholders interpreted the event as having negative 
value-relevance. In that sense, the EU ETS did ‘bite’.  
For the share price responsiveness to the EU ETS three groups of variables were 
checked: 1) the product’s carbon-intensity and carbon leakage, 2) the short and medium-term 
allowance holdings, and 3) the trade in allowances. The results indicate that the product’s 
carbon-intensity and medium-term allowance holdings were, respectively, negatively and 
positively related to the firms’ share prices. As to the medium-term allowance holdings, we 
expected that the carbon price drop would increase the profits for firms having allowances 
shortages, et vice versa. Since we found opposite results, the market possibly incorporates a 
longer time horizon than expected. With future expected stringency of the EU ETS, firms are 
considered more competitive with lower carbon-intensity rates and larger allowance holdings 
as both are signals of better abatement capacities. The EU ETS is thus valued as a restriction 
on pollution. 
Finally, the firms’ trade activity in allowances was not value-relevant. This result may 
well be the consequence of investors lacking sufficient data on the firms’ allowance trade. A 
valuation will then be difficult to make when it is not known whether firms e.g. borrowed or 
stockpiled unused allowances. The market will therefore benefit if the European Commission 
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comments we received from Denny Ellerman, Aleksandar Zaklan, Jurate Jaraitė, and Zofia Lukszo. Any 
remaining errors are our own. 
2
 Due to space constraints, we refer the reader to Böhringer (2014) for a recent, more general overview on EU 
ETS developments. 
3
 There are more event studies on the EU ETS, e.g. Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007). 
4
 This relationship holds with grandfathered allowances. With auctioning the effect on market values is neutral. 
Allowance costs are then not only an opportunity cost but an out-of-pocket expense as well. 
5
 Regulatory changes are often gradual and expected. Event study estimates will then become biased if key dates 
in the regulatory process are ambiguous. However, the information on the excess amount of allowances came as 
a shock to the market (see e.g. Figures 1 and 2). Moreover, in the April 21st 2006 edition of Carbon Market 
Europe of Point Carbon, it was argued that the CO2 price was too low (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008). The 
expectations before the event thus indicate a CO2 price movement in the opposite direction. 
6
 In the calculation of the Return Index, dividends or share splits are corrected for. 
7
 The disclosure of emissions by EU Member States did not take place on the same day. The shock can thus be 
more pronounced for firms from the countries that were first at disclosing their national demand for allowances.  
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8
 Bushnell et al. (2013) take the 26th until the 28th of April as the event window. They stated that little 
information had leaked into the market and that, otherwise, the carbon price would have responded to that. 
However, as Figure 1 shows, the carbon price fall had already started between the 24th and 25th. 
9
 Five days in between the estimation and event window is allowed for to prevent events affecting the event 
window. 
10
 The Orbis database does not provide the percentage of revenues attributable to a firm's installation(s). Firms 
having relatively more installations outside the EU ETS thus seem to have ‘clean’ output. Their lower exposure 
indeed enables them to switch production to the non-EU ETS installations. 
11
 For several firms, we relied on revenue data from Datastream in case Orbis was not able to provide it. 
12
 As the NAPs predetermined most of the allocations for Phase I it should pose less of a problem to assume that 
emissions for 2006 equal those of 2005. 
13
 This trade data, i.e. from the EUTL registry transactions, is published five years after an EU ETS calendar 
year. Investors thus did not have it at their disposal during or before the event. In this analysis it thus functions 
as a trade proxy. Investors should have obtained their allowance trading estimates via other information sources. 
14
 As mentioned in Section 4.3, it could not be discerned whether the allowances received from or surrendered 
to the national registries were part of 2005 or 2006 tranches. Some installations received allowances more than 
twice, suggesting these were corrections rather than allocations. We thus opted for the verified emissions to be 
included in the analysis. 
15
 An overview of the NACE industries, its EU ETS sectors and carbon leakage categorization is available on 
request. 
16
 For cases where the NACE industry text descriptions closely resembled those of the carbon leakage 
descriptions, we allocated them to the carbon leakage list. 
17
 This ETS sector categorization is used in more studies, among others in Ellerman and Joskow (2008). 
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18
 More than half of firms are in sector 8, the residual category. Relatively few firms within sectors 1 to 7 were 
publicly listed. And if we relied on primary or secondary NACE codes instead of core codes, some companies 
are active in more sectors. 
19
 We leave sectors 6 and 7 out of the discussion due to the small number of observations. 
20
 The net effect consists of firms with a positive and a negative event effect. The negative effect amounts to      
€ -109,5 billion and the positive effect to € 55.6 billion. 
21
 We assume firms used (most) of their 2005 allocations to cover their 2005 emissions. The opportunity costs of 
holding allowances will then relate to the 2006 allocation but also the 2007 one, from which firms can borrow 
for their 2006 emissions. 
22
 Table III and Table IV below provide these statistics on different numbers of firms. Of the total amount of 
393 firms, 16 firms had zero allocations so that exp and borrow could not be determined; 27 firms had zero 
emissions so that carbintens and carbileak could not be determined. 
23
 Relative to their purchases and sales, their allocations and emissions were very small. The outlier statistics did 
not detect these three firms as outliers, so they were included in the analysis. 
24
 To detect outliers, the deviation of the residual, the leverage and influence of the observation were considered 
(Baum, 2006: section 5.2.10).  Nature Group PLC and Providence Resources PLC were consistently detected 
and therefore left out of the analysis. 
25
 We performed several robustness checks. More information is available on request. Concerning endogeneity, 
we expect it to be minor. The abnormal returns (i.e. changes in the firms’ expected profitability) as well as the 
independent variables are in relative rather than absolute terms. During the small event window, unobserved 
heterogeneous factors from the error term (e.g. productivity levels) are therefore unlikely to have changed and 
thereby impacted the abnormal returns via the covariates. Furthermore, the event was not anticipated (cf. 
endnote 5) and it was not induced by firms themselves, but by the EU Member States release of emissions 
information. 
26
 We use robust clustered standard errors based on the eight industry sectors.  
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27
 While Holland and Moore (2012) is on the Los Angeles NOX market, it may be applicable to (non-point) CO2 
emissions as well. 
